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Abstract. Telecom providers are losing tremendous amounts of money
due to fraud risks posed to Telecom services and products. Currently,
they are mainly focusing on fraud detection approaches to reduce the
impact of fraud risks against their services. However, fraud prevention
approaches should also be investigated in order to further reduce fraud
risks and improve the revenue of Telecom providers. Fraud risk modelling
is a fraud prevention approach aims at identifying the potential fraud
risks, estimating the damage and setting up preventive mechanisms be-
fore the fraud risks lead to actual losses. In this paper, we highlight the
important requirements for a usable and context-aware fraud risk mod-
elling approach for Telecom services. To do so, we have conducted two
workshops with experts from a Telecom provider and experts from multi-
disciplinary areas. In order to show and document the requirements, we
present two exemplary Telecom fraud scenarios, analyse and estimate
the impacts of fraud risks qualitatively.
Key words: fraud risk, requirement elicitation, fraud modelling, service
security, telecommunication, risk assessment
1 Introduction
Telecom providers are losing billions of dollars every year due to frauds. Ac-
cording to the Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA), the global
revenue of Telecom providers was affected by almost $38.1 billion (USD) in
the year 2015 [1] due to frauds. Fraud is the use of a Telecom service to gain
money or with no intention to pay. There are many types of Telecom frauds.
The top five types mentioned in the 2015 CFCA report are International Rev-
enue Share Fraud (IRSF), interconnect bypass, premium rate services, arbitrage
and theft/stolen goods. IRSF costed the Telecom providers almost $10.76 billion
(USD) globally in the year 2015 [1], which is almost threefold from the year 2011.
Telecom providers store subscribers usage behaviour - known as call data
records (CDR) - in a database. Telecom fraud detection systems (FDSs) usu-
ally use anomaly-based fraud detection relying on identifying anomalies through
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comparing the past and current or recent behaviour of subscribers [2, 3, 4]. Al-
though a FDS has advantages, it has also a problem of detecting frauds only
once a fraudster follows a predefined and/or behaviour-based pattern stored in
the detection system – which increases the reaction time if it happens in a larger
scale. Given these and the (revenue-loss) figures above, it is not surprising that
Telecom providers aim to reduce the damage. Thus, in order to predict fraud
risks beforehand and take preventive measures, a fraud risk assessment approach
is required as part of Telecom service security.
According to ISO/IEC 27005 [5] a risk assessment process starts from un-
derstanding the context and performing risk analysis. In terms of the Telecom
domain, the risk assessment process begins by understanding the Telecom service
under assessment, identifying the potential risks and estimating the consequences
of those risks. We believe this process substantially helps to reduce the level of
fraud risks before a given Telecom service is under attack. Basing on the general
risk assessment process, the first step for a usable and context-aware fraud risk
modelling approach is to elicit requirements necessary to develop the intended
approach. The main contribution of this paper is, therefore, eliciting the impor-
tant requirements for a context-aware and model-based fraud risk modelling at
different stages of the assessment.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background
on the context of Telecom services and fraud risks. Section 4 describes the
methodologies used in order to elicit the requirements of fraud risk modelling.
Section 3 discusses the related work on security requirements in the Telecom
domain. In Section 5, two exemplary fraud scenarios are described. We also per-
formed a risk analysis on each scenario to show fraud enablers and document
the initial requirements on fraud risk modelling. These requirements at different
stages of fraud risk modelling are discussed in Section 6. At last, Section 7 sum-
marises and concludes the important points in the paper and provides insights
for future work on fraud risk modelling approaches.
2 Background: Telecom Services and Types of Fraud
The core elements of Business Process Management (BPM) in a Telecom
provider involve “products” (actually services) and the infrastructures to “pro-
duce” them [6]. The other elements of the BPM are based on these core elements -
the operations, marketing and service delivery management [6]. Telecom services
include call services (mobile and fixed-line), roaming services [7], data services,
Internet services (e.g. VoIP service) and messaging services.
When taking a closer look, most Telecom services require a complex techni-
cal network architecture. This is due to a multitude of different interconnected
networks, network operators and service providers. At the same time, in most
cases, the underlying business models are tailored to compete in highly com-
petitive markets. This entails opposed financial interests of the participants and
very often even more complex services. Furthermore, this proves fertile ground
for fraud or misuse.
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Telecom frauds affect both fixed line and mobile services which could be
provided through either prepaid or post-paid contracts [8][9][4][10]. There exist
several categories of fraud in the literature, e.g. [11], [12], [13] and [14]. Some of
the known methods that fraudsters use to commit fraud include:
PBX hacking: A Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is a telephone network
used within a company to switch calls coming from outside the company rather
than installing individual telephone lines to each user in a company - which is
very expensive. Fraudsters identify the potential weaknesses of PBXs to forward
calls from the outside network, as PBXs provide the capability to remotely con-
nect to a central portal (voicemail) [15][16]. According to CFCA [1], the damage
of PBX hacking in the year 2015 is estimated to $3.93 billion (USD).
Subscription fraud: This is another typical method of committing fraud
[3][4]. It happens through using users’ information illegally either through scam-
ming or other forms of social engineering attacks. According to CFCA [1], the
damage of subscription fraud in the year 2015 is estimated around $3.53 billion
(USD).
Wangiri fraud: Wangiri fraud, originated in Japan, is also known as “one
ring and cut” fraud which makes everybody a target by making calls and waiting
for a reply [17]. When victims call back, they would listen to advertisements from
a premium internet service or calls. This will cause expensive bills to the users
who call back to the missed-call.
In the paper, we focus on business-related fraud risks and used the following
definitions.
– Telecommunications Service Provider (TSP): A TSP covers the different types
of providers of Telecom services, regardless of whether they operate a network
by themselves or just (re)sell services.
– Call termination: Call termination is a service of a TSP to route phone calls
from another TSP to customers of the first TSP. Call termination could hap-
pen for national and international calls.
3 Related Work
Ensuring the security of a system is a fuzzy challenge but through procedural
techniques, the level of system or service security can be improved. One way is
through “implementing” security requirements using security engineering meth-
ods. Unfortunately, traditional risk analysis and security engineering methods
have several limitations when applied to Telecom cases [18]. Zuccato et al. [18]
proposed a security requirement engineering method - SKYDD - including infras-
tructure, business and information requirements based on checklists, guidelines
and expert knowledge. In continuation to this work, Zuccato et al. [19] proposed
an approach which is a step by step process to use service security requirement
profiles. They outlined four basic requirements for the approach: economic fea-
sibility, agility, multi-disciplinity and help without the need for security experts.
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The approach is, therefore, intended to span all kinds of security issues (mostly
related to business related risks).
Tian et al. [20] presented a requirement model not for the security domain
but for a solution domain in the Telecom field such as an SDP (Service Delivery
Platform). This domain requirement model allows producing a model that can
be easily navigated through its hierarchical structure to incorporate featured
and detailed requirements for stakeholders and developers respectively. In re-
lation to the usage of Telecom services, Krogstie [21] highlighted the areas to
focus in order to cope with the technology shifts of mobile information systems.
He described the advantage of involving the concept of mobility and people’s
involvement (the context) in mobile information systems using requirement en-
gineering mechanisms.
In general, even though there is a limited amount of literature in the area of
Telecom service security, some of the papers above have some relation with secu-
rity and requirements engineering. Still, none of the papers focuses on preventive
risk modelling requirements to deal with fraud risks. Recently, we showed a risk
analysis using a value-based approach [22]. As a continuation to cover identifica-
tion, analysis and estimation of fraud risks, this paper highlights requirements
on fraud risk modelling for the case of Telecom services.
4 Methodology
To elicit the requirements on fraud risk modelling, we have conducted two work-
shops. In total, eleven experts have attended the workshops. Four of them are
experts from a TSP who have experience of Telecom fraud and seven of them
are security researchers from inter-disciplinary fields (information security, com-
puter science and mathematics). On first sight the number of involved experts
may look small. However due to the high secrecy requirements of anti-fraud mea-
sures it is actually quite difficult to conduct workshops like these, where several
experts in front of researchers discuss issues and even contribute different opin-
ions in a single session. Therefore, the workshop lead to results, that are novel,
even though the quantitative base is not the largest.
The first workshop was conducted with the experts from the TSP (seven
participants including the authors for three hours). The workshop was conducted
with a moderated discussion where the people from the TSP presented different
types of Telecom fraud (revenue-share fraud, roaming fraud, call selling fraud
and PBX fraud). In the discussion session, they also discussed the effects of
those frauds to the TSP. Through questioning and answering, they discussed
their expectations of fraud prevention approaches to reduce the effects of fraud
to the TSP. In this paper, we present two of the fraud scenarios to show how we
elicited the requirements on fraud risk modelling.
Taking their expectations, in the second workshop – where only security
researchers met with eight participants for three hours – we formulated prob-
lems of those example fraud scenarios, identified the potential fraud enablers,
estimated qualitatively the impacts of the fraud scenarios on the Telecom. The
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main outcome of this workshop was a list of initial requirements for a risk mod-
elling approach. A risk modelling approach consists of three main components:
conceptual model, analysis and estimation. The requirements are covering all of
the three components.
5 Analysis of Exemplary Fraud Scenarios and
Expectations of TSP
In this section, two exemplary revenue-share fraud scenarios are presented and
analysed to show how we have elicited the requirements on a risk modelling
approach for Telecom services. We also discussed the expectations of the TSP
expressed in the first workshop. We chose the two exemplary fraud scenarios
because they show very well: 1) the involvement of several actors and entities to
commit a fraud; 2) chain(s) of fraudulent activities in a simplified way; 3) money
flows (fraud risks) of fraudulent actors; and 4) the contribution of technological
weaknesses to fraud risks. Some other fraud scenarios can be found in (e.g. [22]).
5.1 Exemplary Fraud Scenarios
Customers of TSPs in possession of insider knowledge could identify possible
arbitrage scenarios by combining TSP services and products (often involving
multiple TSPs). One prominent example is the use of flat-rate tariffs for call
termination. Another example is the involvement of weak identity checks for
new connections to enable a portfolio of usage scenarios that violate at least
the terms and conditions of the TSPs involved, which results in a profit for the
fraudster. We are using these two example scenarios to show how we documented
the requirements on the risk modelling. For both scenarios, even though the net
loss of a TSP resulting from a single customer’s usage pattern is not a problem
per se for the respective TSP, a large-scale systematic exploitation of such a
scenario however will add up to a critical level.
Fraud scenario 1 - Tariff misuse for call termination
Mr. Clever, a fraudster, has (multiple) fixed, mobile or virtual IP connection
points with TSP A. These are billed either as flat-rate or in tariff schemes which
include capacious minute budgets. Also, Mr. Clever has (multiple) fixed, mobile
or virtual IP connection points with TSP B. Call termination fees are paid on
a per minute basis by TSP A when calls are delivered from TSP A to TSP B.
TSP B passes a part of the received call termination fees to Mr. Clever, thereby
providing a payout per minute for incoming calls as incentive to generate as much
incoming traffic as possible to the network of TSP B. This process is mostly
done by an intermediary company, whose main activity is bridging between the
fraudster and fraudulent TSPs. Mr. Clever makes calls from TSP A to TSP B
in order to maximise his profit from these payouts. The money flow is shown
in Fig. 1. The source of Mr. Clever’s profit is the call termination fee paid by
TSP A to TSP B, which is then partly paid out to Mr. Clever by TSP B (Mr.
Clever’s costs at TSP A are fixed due to the chosen tariff).
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Fig. 1. Money flow for scenario 1 Fig. 2. Money flow for scenario 2
Fraud scenario 2 - fraud involving the false pretence of being willing
and able to pay
This scenario can be described in five sequential steps.
1. Mr. Clever obtains a high number of prepaid (pay as you go) SIM cards.
These SIM cards are either not (yet) registered or registered using fake or
stolen IDs. Furthermore, these SIM cards are billed either as flat-rate, have a
very low price per minute, or have free minutes (upon activation). In addition
to these prepaid SIM cards, Mr. Clever manages to establish one post-paid
mobile contract with TSP A using a fake ID or forged identity and bank
card credentials. Thus, with respect to the post-paid mobile contract, this
scenario is a matter of fraud involving the false pretence of being willing and
able to pay.
2. Mr. Clever activates call forwarding on the post-paid mobile connection point
to a (foreign) external TSP B. He then makes the highest number of possi-
ble parallel calls to that post-paid mobile connection point using the above
prepaid SIM cards. All calls will be diverted to TSP B. Call termination fees
are paid on a per minute basis by TSP A when calls are delivered from TSP
A to TSP B.
3. The fraud detection system (FDS) of TSP A may detect the violation of
limits on the post-paid mobile connection contract and disconnect it within
the response time.
4. Mr. Clever does not pay the post-paid bill.
5. TSP B passes a part of the received call termination fees on to Mr. Clever,
thereby providing a payout per minute for incoming calls. The money flow
is shown in Fig. 2.
The source of Mr. Clever’s profit is the call termination fee paid by TSP A to
TSP B, which is then partly paid out to Mr. Clever by TSP B, while outstanding
receivables of TSP A will remain unpaid and become a bad debt.
5.2 Fraud Risks: Partial Risks from the Exemplary Scenarios
For the two scenarios presented in Section 5.1, we have discussed the (partial)
risks identified in the workshop which allow a fraudster to perpetrate the fraud.
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Risks are named partial as their discrete or isolated occurrence would not nec-
essarily be relevant to the company while multiple risks constitute a (relevant)
fraud scenario. We have then estimated qualitatively the partial risks based on
their contribution to the occurrence of the fraud scenarios. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we decided to use a risk estimation scale with three values: High, Medium
and Low. A High rating has a significant contribution to the occurrence of a fraud
and has impact at least on one of the dimensions (e.g. reputation, money, etc.).
Medium and Low means less contribution and impact. The identified partial
risks are described below.
R.1 Weak identity checks enable a fraudster to acquire a high num-
ber of prepaid (pay-as-you-go) SIM cards using fake IDs: Sound identity
and credit checks are costly. Due to high pricing pressure in the Telecom market,
the economically reasonable level of effort is limited. This holds true especially
for prepaid (pay-as-you-go) SIM cards, leading to a higher risk of identity fraud.
– Impact: High
– Initial requirement: the risk modelling approach should model the processes of
acquiring different types of Telecom connections and identify fraud risks due
to weak identity checks.
R.2 A fraudster manages to mask fraudulent calls to simulate legit-
imate traffic: Fraud detection systems (FDSs) are operated by TSPs to detect
excessive usage of their network resources. In a case of misuse, the FDS should
detect the violation of limits, e.g. multiple long-lasting connections of similar
length or to the same destination number. Distributing calls using multiple des-
tination numbers and a random duration would mask the fraudulent activity
making it much harder to detect.
– Impact: High
– Initial requirement: the risk modelling approach should model the possible
actions in the existing fraud detection mechanisms, identify the potential risks
against such mechanisms and analyse their impact.
R.3 A fraudster acquires a post-paid contract using fake IDs: Stolen
identity documents and bank account information enable fraudsters to sign up
for a post-paid contract. Factors which facilitate this are: Contract concluded
online, sloppy work of retail personnel, acceptance of copied identity documents.
– Impact: Medium
– Initial requirement: the risk modelling approach should model the processes
how customers or fraudsters acquire different types of connections (including
post-paid) and identify weak points that create fraud risks.
R.4 A fraudster manages to find a TSP B which provides payout:
There are different TSPs in the market offering payments and incentives to their
customers for incoming calls. These incentives need to be usable in a profitable
scenario with the products of a TSP A in order for the fraudster to make a profit.
– Impact: High
– Initial requirement: the fraud risk modelling approach should incorporate the
influences of external services. In reality, this might be difficult to achieve, but
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with existing data about the external services, it is possible to estimate the
damage of the external influence.
R.5 High response time of TSP A’s implemented fraud detection
system (FDS): Depending on the implementation of the FDS, response times
may vary between 15 and approximately 60 minutes.
– Impact: Low
– Initial requirement: besides modelling the possible actions, the fraud risk mod-
elling approach should model the response time of fraud detection mechanisms
in order to analyse and estimate the impacts of a fraud.
R.6 A new product thwarts the business model of existing prod-
ucts: A TSP launches a product without properly considering its side-effects
and interdependencies with existing products and the resulting user behaviour.
– Impact: Low
– Initial requirement: the fraud risk modelling approach should incorporate im-
pact analysis of new products to the existing models.
5.3 Expectations of TSP Experts
New Telecom services usually have to be launched under significant time pres-
sure, e.g. to minimize the time-to-market or to react swiftly to a move of a
competitor. This leaves little time and space to account for potential misuse.
As discussed in Section 5.2, misuses could happen due to sloppy (service) de-
sign, underestimation, or misjudgement of the extent of possible exploitation by
fraudsters and their motivation to find combinations of different services often
involving multiple providers. Based on the discussion in the workshop with the
TSP experts, they expect that a preventive approach to:
– identify as many misuse scenarios as possible to find out whether a service is
reasonably profitable;
– minimise potential risks associated with the service (and, as a result, potential
losses);
– work as a preventive solution or technique for dealing with potential fraud
related to Telecom services before it is exploited (in a large scale).
6 Requirements on Fraud Risk Modelling
Based on the outcomes of initial requirements and the expectations of the TSP,
we propose a fraud risk modelling approach (cf. Fig. 3). This fraud risk modelling
approach involves representation of service, identification and analysis of poten-
tial fraud risks and estimation of their impacts. The fraud risk assessment starts
with modelling the context of the TSP service under assessment in a conceptual
model – a model which represents the context of the target of assessment to the
intended level of abstraction. Through this conceptual model, a fraud analyst is
able to communicate, identify fraud risks and estimate potential damages. Tak-
ing this into consideration, the first three subsections in the following describe
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Fig. 3. Components in the fraud risk modelling approach
the requirements of each component in the fraud risk modelling approach (con-
ceptual modelling, fraud analysis and estimation) followed by supplementary
requirements (data management and visualisation).
The requirements at each component should generally be evaluated based on
the following criteria:
– context-awareness – the ability to include internal and external factors in the
analysis of a Telecom service;
– representativeness – the capability of representing essential elements of the
target of assessment;
– scalability – the ability to handle complex Telecom cases with a reasonable
performance;
– usability – the ability to support users efficiently and effectively. This includes
the ability to generate the potential fraud risk scenarios and prioritise them.
It also includes the capability of using different data formats in the assessment
process.
6.1 Requirements on the Conceptual Model
As shown in the example scenarios above, the context of a TSP service includes
several independent stakeholders, contract agreements between them, anti-fraud
agents, Telecom employees, hardware and software, virtual communications, and
network infrastructures.
The model needs to be able to represent a list of relevant properties of the
entities (products and services) involved, including ownership of entities and a
financial budget of the entities. The TSP service includes at least two parties
(from now on we call them actors): subscribers and one or more service providers
(TSPs). Subscribers receive a service with a short term or long term agreement
provided by a TSP. The model, therefore, should represent contractual agree-
ments and jurisdictional requirements.
For a roaming service, for instance, an additional external TSP is involved
to fulfil the goals of the home TSP. Both the subscribers and the home TSP
pay service fees. From the home TSP’s perspective, a subscriber pays money
for the service in different forms: prepaid, post-paid, or with some contractual
agreement. The home TSP pays for the service given to its subscribers while
roaming. These transactions between several independent actors create chances
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for fraudsters to perpetrate frauds or misuse the service. Therefore, the model
should represent relations between different entities, as interrelations between
different partial risks coincide and enable an attacker/fraudster to carry out an
attack/fraud.
Depending on the type of a TSP service, the relevant entities should be iden-
tified and represented in the conceptual model, where the model serves as a
medium of communication between, for example, the modeller and fraud ana-
lysts. Therefore, the model is expected to have formal or semi-formal semantics.
The representativeness of the model with respect to the service under assess-
ment is in general the evaluation criterion to the requirements on the conceptual
model. The following summarises the high-level requirements on the conceptual
model. The conceptual model should represent:
– entities and their relevant properties, including ownership of entities and fi-
nancial budget of the entities;
– the possible actions at each entity;
– relations between different entities, as interrelations between different partial
risks may coincide and enable a fraudster to carry out a fraud;
– contractual agreements and jurisdictional requirements; the processes of ac-
quiring different types of Telecom connections;
– the existing fraud detection mechanisms of the Telecom service in the model.
6.2 Requirements on the Analysis
Fraud analysis is the process of identifying the potential fraud scenarios and
estimating the related potential economic damage to the TSP. Given the relevant
entities in the contextual model of a TSP service, it should be possible to show
or generate damaging incidents from the model. Damaging incidents have a
damaging effect on the revenue of the TSP when implemented with a large
enough level of scale. The analysis has to predict the possible fraud within a
small amount of time before it amplifies the damage.
Depending on the type of a TSP service, the analysis process may leverage
necessary data in relation to the contextual model - for instance, CDRs to analyse
the fraud on fixed line call services. As the goal of the analysis is to predict
potential fraud risks and propose preventive measures, it might leverage the
usage-data in order to achieve this goal.
The analysis process should also incorporate the contractual and jurisdic-
tional requirements on the TSP service under assessment. In the TSP service
environments such as roaming, the jurisdictional requirements are crucial. In
some countries, the delay in providing service usage files to the home TSP pro-
vides a chance for fraudsters to perform the fraud undetected for an extended
time span. In some other countries, where Near-Real-Time Roaming Data Ex-
change is applied, the delay of the data exchange is limited to only four hours
- if delayed the visited TSP is responsible for any kind of fraud detected after
those four hours. Additionally, there are contract agreements in place between
TSPs, covering subjects of interconnection fees and inter-operator charges. The
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fraud analysis, therefore, should consider both the contractual and jurisdictional
requirements in order to predict the potential fraud risks in a TSP service.
Fraudsters use complex ways to perpetrate fraud in order to hide or legitimise
their acts. Depending on the TSP service, the analysis approach should identify
complex correlations of partial risks (cf. Section 5.2) to estimate the potential
damage resulting from the fraud risks. The following summarises the high-level
requirements on the analysis component. The analysis component should:
– identify fraud risks by identifying fraud factors from the conceptual model;
different ways to identify fraud factors. To mention some: 1) by identifying
the weaknesses of the components in the contextual model; 2) by using fraud
patterns that fraudsters use as a guideline to identify fraud factors (e.g. due to
weak identity checks). Evaluation criterion: context-awareness and scalability ;
– consider contractual agreements and jurisdictional requirements in identifying
the fraud risks. Evaluation criterion: context-awareness;
– handle complex correlations of partial risks. Evaluation criterion: usability ;
– collect fraud scenarios identified due to fraud factors in a file format so that
other fraud risk modelling components would use it (e.g. the risk estimation
component to prioritise those fraud risks). Evaluation criterion: usability.
6.3 Requirements on the Risk Estimation
As explained in Section 5.3, new TSP products need to be launched under sig-
nificant time pressure resulting from strong competition in a dynamic market,
leaving little time and space to analyse and account for potential misuse of the
product. At the same time, there is a (natural) conflict between on the one hand,
the (marketing) department – responsible for product development and seeking
business opportunities with a tendency to put a gloss on business case figures –
and on the other hand, the misuse department – which has its focus on potential
misuse and avoiding risks. In many organisations, these two departments act
independently from one another and have different target functions.
Due to a persistent increase in product complexity, diversity on the feature
side, and margin pressure on mass products, risks cannot be eliminated, but
need to be assumed, estimated and accepted with some level of threshold, whilst
minimising their possible impact. Hence, the focus of the risk estimation process
should be on the question of calculability. The identified fraud scenarios should
be estimated from different impact dimensions, mainly based on their economic
impacts.
Basing on the types of the TSP services, the fraud risk modelling approach
should have a framework for estimating fraud scenarios – either a qualitative or
a quantitative estimation. TSP risks can qualitatively be represented in differ-
ent levels of magnitudes. These magnitudes are interpreted based on the conse-
quences of the fraud risk. As an example, High could be the loss beyond $10K,
Medium between $10K and $4K, and Low below $4K. In the example scenarios
(Section 5.2), we used three levels of qualitative measurement – High, Medium
and Low to estimate the partial risks. Risk estimation using contextual models
12 Ahmed Seid Yesuf et al.
is usually qualitative but when it is supported by statistical and usage data, it
could be expressed in terms of quantitative measurements. In general, a preven-
tive fraud risk modelling approach should estimate those risks identified in the
previous stage in either qualitative or qualitative measurements.
The following summarises the high-level requirements on the risk estimation.
The risk estimation component should estimate:
– the impacts of the identified fraud risks based on different dimensions (e.g. its
economic impact). Evaluation criterion: usability ;
– the fraud risks in either qualitative or quantitative scale. Evaluation criterion:
usability.
6.4 Requirements on Visualisation
In the course of fraud risk modelling, visualising inputs and outputs is necessary
for a usable approach to facilitate decision making. Decision makers (commercial
managers at the TSP) are interested in understanding the effect of fraud risks at a
larger scale. To satisfy the goals of TSP stakeholders, visualisation requirements
on fraud risk modelling are, therefore, important.
The approach should provide sufficient visualisation at different diverging
aspects. A model should visually represent actors (economically or technically),
assets, existing policies, the possible connections between actors, boundary re-
strictions and potential fraudulent actors. It should also depict, which part of
the TSP service or product is vulnerable to a known type of fraud.
At the stage of fraud analysis, the approach should visually represent the
costs of damage produced by the fraud on a given TSP service - for instance,
in a graph where the likelihood of fraud is shown while the detection time in-
creases or when fraudulent actors increase in number. In addition to visualising
individual effects of some particular fraud, it should also be possible to visu-
alise the correlations of misuse scenarios within a TSP service that make up
fraud. Mostly, fraud is committed either through disguising as legitimate users
or through leveraging legitimate services. Thus, the approach should clearly de-
pict accepted scenarios, hidden transactions that could possibly happen between
fraudulent actors, and potentially unwanted fraud scenarios in a given TSP ser-
vice.
The evaluation criterion of these requirements is usability. The following are
the high-level requirements on the visualisation component. In general the visu-
alisation component should visualise:
– the contextual model, the impact of fraud and the correlations of misuse sce-
narios;
– fraud scenarios of a given TSP service.
6.5 Requirements on Data Management
The core targets of the fraud risk modelling approach are TSPs and similar
service providers. A TSP has a lot of usage data of subscribers available for
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analysis, but their availability for processing may be legally restricted for e.g.
data protection reasons. Thus, the fraud risk modelling approach should consider
data management requirements.
The approach needs to provide performance scalability in order to be able to
cope with massive amounts of data if needed, e.g. billions of CDRs. It should also
be flexible to process data coming from different data formats as data sources
stem from the domain of the different Telecom partners. The following sum-
marises the requirements on the data management component. It should:
– be scalable to handle huge amounts of Telecom data. Evaluation criterion:
Scalability ;
– handle different data formats. Evaluation criterion: Usability.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Fraud risks emerge due to single or combined individual risks against weakly
protected elements of a service. Fraud risk modelling helps to identify weak-
nesses in the elements of the service, analyse the potential individual risks and
estimate their impacts to the service provider. Even though the requirements
are elicited from a limited number of fraud cases, they provide a guideline to
develop a context-aware and usable fraud risk modelling approach besides im-
proving the state-of-the-art on fraud risk assessment. One way of developing such
an approach is by realising the requirements and apply the resulting approach
to a list of Telecom services one by one and iteratively improve the approach in
each development milestone. In this regard, the involvement of service providers
is undoubtedly important in the evaluation of the approach.
In future, we plan to use the requirements above to develop a context-aware
fraud risk modelling approach and refine it repeatedly based on feedback from
Telecom providers, so that the approach can be applicable to one or several types
of Telecom frauds. The other future research direction is to find detailed criteria
to evaluate the effectiveness and usefulness of the fraud risk modelling approach.
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